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Claims Against the State of Kentucky-
The Board of Claims*
By PAUL OBERST** AND THOMAS P. LEwIs***
The newest breach in Kentucky's sovereign immunity is the
act of the legislature providing for payment of negligence claims
against the state through the State Board of Claims. This legisla-
tion, providing an administrative remedy to supplement existing
judicial and legislative remedies, had its origin in an act of 1946
setting up a Highway Board of Claims with jurisdiction over
claims for personal injury or property damage due to negligence
in the construction, reconstruction, maintenance or policing of
highways by the Highway Department. In 1950, the jurisdiction
was extended to any acts of negligence on the part of the Com-
monwealth, its departments, agencies or employees, and the maxi-
mum amount recoverable was raised from $1,000 to $5,000. Over
750 claims have already been filed and this remedy has become the
most important method by which the injured individual may
recover from the Commonwealth.
This article will consider first the organization, jurisdiction
and procedure of the Board of Claims; second, the substantive
output to show what kinds of claims are made and what kinds are
allowed by the Board; and finally suggestions will be made for
improvement.
Organization
The Board is a three-man body composed of a Judge of the
Court of Appeals, the State Attorney General and the State Com-
missioner of Finance.1 The Board elects one of its members as
* This article is the third of a series on the liability of the Commonwealth.
The fourth and final article, dealing with special resolutions of the legislature al-
lowing claims or suit on claims, will appear in the November, 1954, issue.
** A.B., Evansville College; LL.B., University of Kentucky; LL.M., Uni-
versity of Michigan. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ken-
tucky.
*** LL.B., University of Kentucky; former Editor-in-Chief, Kentucky Law
Journal.1Provision for these members is found in Ky. REv. STAT. 44.070 (1953). A
commissioner of the Court of Appeals may be appointed by the Chief Justice in-
stead of an associate judge. At present Associate Judge John Moreman is thejudicial member. No definite term of office is prescribed for the judicial member;
he serves at the pleasure of the Chief Justice.
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chairman. Pursuant to Ky. REv. STAT. 44.080, the Board has
adopted its own rules of organization and practice.2 Under the
present rules, meetings of the Board of Claims are held in the
clerk's office in the Capitol Annex in Frankfort on the third Mon-
day in January, May and September. Recently the Board has been
holding special meetings to pass on nonhearing claims, usually on
the first Monday of the month. It is at these meetings that all
claims finally are allowed or rejected, but prior to this stage an
individual claim will have been "processed" by other persons who
have a part in the administrative procedure. Two such persons
who are attached to the Board of Claims are the clerk of the Board
and the referee. The clerk occupies an office in Frankfort and
maintains files containing the pleadings, correspondence, tran-
scripts of hearings and other information pertaining to each claim.
She also carries on the bulk of official correspondence, and, under
the direction of the Chairman of the Board, prepares the schedules
of hearings, and mails notices of hearings and subpoenas to the
plaintiff and defendant. The referee, according to the rules of the
Board, performs such functions as from time to time may be pre-
scribed by the Board. Briefly, his duties consist of conducting
hearings and preparing a report of his findings of law and fact and
a recommendation concerning the award and its amount. He may
also make a report in cases in which the facts are stipulated. At
the present time there are two referees, one for Eastern Kentucky
and one for Western Kentucky. Another participant in the claims
procedure is the attorney representing the defendant agency or
department. This will be an assistant attorney general assigned to
the particular agency or department.3
Jurisdiction
Before entering a discussion of the practice before the Board
it is important to define exactly what claims fall within its jurisdic-
tion. Ky. Riv. STAT. 44.070 limits the Board's jurisdiction to com-
pensating persons for damages "sustained to either person or prop-
'These rules are published in mimeograph form and can be obtained by
writing the clerk of the Board, whose office is in Frankfort in the Capitol Annex.
They are also available in the Kentucky Administrative Regulations Service pub-
lished by the Reviser of Statutes. The regulations are in the process of revision.3 Ky. REv. STAT. 44.090 (1953) seems to contemplate designation of one as-
sistant to represent all departments. The practice is for each assistant to represent
the particular department to which he is regularly assigned.
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erty as a proximate result of negligence on the part of the Com-
monwealth, any of its departments or agencies, or any of its agents,
or employees while acting within the scope of their employment.
• . ." Intentional injuries and acts giving rise to absolute liability
are not redressable before the Board of Claims.4
Under some circumstances a claimant may have a remedy both
in the Board of Claims and in circuit court. For example, if the
Department of Highways negligently damages a citizen's property
in such a way or to such an extent as to constitute a "taking" of
property, the landowner may be allowed a suit in the circuit court
under the theory of reverse eminent domain.5 At the same time,
he has an actionable claim before the Board because his damage
resulted from the negligence of a state department. Does the new
Board remedy oust the courts of their jurisdiction in these cases?
Ky. REv. STAT. 44.160 provides:
Filing of claims as optional remedy. KRS 44.070
to 44.160 [statutory provisions which create the Board of
Claims] shall not be construed to deprive any person whose
claim amounts to more than $5,000 from suing in the courts,
where such rights exist or would have existed if KRS 44.070
to 44.160 had not been enacted into the laws of this Com-
monwealth.... (Italics writers')
By express provision it is seen that a claim for more than
$5,000 can still be prosecuted in circuit court if the facts fall
within the theory of reverse eminent domain. However, the very
existence of such a provision would seem to imply that where the
claim is for $5,000 or less, and thus redressable completely under
the Board of Claims provisions, the Board remedy is exclusive.
Weight is added to this interpretation by the words italicized in
the above quotation, "would have existed." If a right to sue in
the courts "would have existed" if the Board of Claims Act had
not been enacted, the necessary implication seems to be that where
complete relief can be had under the Board, the "right" no longer
exists and the Board relief is exclusive. Against these arguments,
' Compare the Federal Tort Claims Act which creates sovereign liability for
the torts of its agents, then excepts from coverage practically all, if not all, in-
tentional acts. 62 STAT. 933, 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b) (Supp. 1952), read with 63
STAT. 984, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (Supp. 1952).5 For a discussion of this theory and its ramifications, see the second article
of this series, Claims Against the State-Reverse Eminent Domain, 42 Ky. L. J.
163 (1954).
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however, is the title to 44.160 quoted above, "Filing of claims as
optional remedy." If the remedy were truly optional suit in the
courts should lie where the damages asked are less than $5,000,
otherwise the Board remedy would never be optional, except in
the sense that a claimant might have an option between seeking
full damages in the courts and seeking partial damages up to
$5,000 before the Board.
The same problem exists in regard to special acts. Obviously,
under Ky. REv. STAT. 44.160 a claimant can seek a special resolu-
tion when his damages exceed $5,000, but can he if his damage is
$5,000 or less? Of course practicalities would seem to demand
that where a simple method of relief is available, the claimant
would not undertake the burdensome job of obtaining a special
act, unless he is under some illusion about the generosity of Ken-
tucky juries. Even if the legislature could pass the special act, the
fact that the petitioner has an available remedy would have great
weight as a factor in favor of denying his request.
Several cases have arisen which presented an opportunity to
the Court of Appeals to decide whether the Board of Claims Act
creates an exclusive remedy where it is applicable, but the ques-
tion appears not to have been raised by counsel, and the court has
not yet passed on the issue.0
Procedure
Initiating the claim.* It is provided in the rules adopted by
the Board that pleadings and practice before the Board shall be
governed by the Kentucky Code of Practice in civil cases relating
to circuit courts having terms. Changes are being made to reflect
the recent adoption of new rules for civil practice in the state.
Under the new regulations, an action is commenced by filing a
o In discussing the procedure before the Board of Claims conclusions will be
drawn from the claims filed against the Highway Department unless otherwise
indicated, since the Department is the defendant in the overwhelming majority of
claims.
' For example, see Commonwealth v. Kelley, 814 Ky. 581, 286 S.W. 2d 695
(1951). Oddly enough, although the courts do not seem to be bothered by the
suggested lack of jurisdiction, the Board has had some doubt as to whether it
should entertain claims which could have been brought in circuit court. This is
of primary importance since the chief concern of this article is whether the Board
will accept a claim, not whether the claimant might have an alternative remedy
in circuit court. Therefore, the problem from the viewpoint of the Board will be
treated more thoroughly in the section of this article on the substantive law of the
Board.
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complaint with the clerk of the Board of Claims in Frankfort.
This complaint must be filed within one year of the accrual of the
cause of action.7 To insure efficient and speedy processing of
claims, a complaint should be drawn which states a claim for which
relief can be granted and which will withstand the scrutiny of an
adversary attorney. Two copies of the complaint must be filed
with the clerk, one to be docketed and placed in the file which
will eventually contain all matters thereafter relating to the claim,
the other to be sent by the clerk to the assistant attorney general
in charge of defending the department against which the claim is
made.8 No summons need issue on any pleading.9
It is specified in the rules of the Board that only one copy of
any pleading subsequent to the complaint need be filed with the
clerk by the parties provided the endorsement appears thereon
that a copy has been sent to the adversary attorney. The answer
and other responsive pleadings must be filed within twenty days
from the filing of the pleading requiring the response.10 Pleadings
which raise questions of law must, upon the written request of a
party, be certified by the clerk to the Board for decision. A memo-
randum of points and authorities must accompany such pleading
and a copy thereof should be submitted to the other party."
Informal claims. In accordance with section 705 of Carroll's
Code of Civil Procedure, a petition was unnecessary for claims of
$50.00 or less. Informal pleadings were sufficient and consequently
such small claims could be initiated before the Board by letter.
Section 705 has been repealed and the Rules of Civil Procedure
make no similar provision. Although no specific rules have been
formulated by the Board for small claims, certain practices never-
theless developed and whether official or not appeared to be fol-
lowed rather consistently.
It is only natural that an informal claim was not required to
state a technical cause of action under the Code. Whatever in-
formality may be allowed under the Rules of Civil Procedure, it
is in the claimant's interest to set forth certain details to facilitate
'Ky. REv. STAT. 44.110 (1953).
'Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Kentucky Board of Claims (1950).9 ibid.
20 Ibid.
'Ibid. The Board meets to approve or reject claims only three times a year
as noted previously, but for the consideration of matters of law such as motions,
demurrers, etc., the Board is in continuous session. Ibid.
CLAims AGAINST T STATE
the consequent investigation. Such facts as the date and place of
the accident, the amount and proof of damages (if an automobile
accident is the basis of damages, the most acceptable proof is two
estimates of repair costs by reputable garagemen), any pertinent
information which will help to identify the person and vehicle,
if any, through which the injury occurred, and any reference
within the knowledge of the claimant to reports filed by state
officials in regard to the accident should be included. Completed
claims indicate that none of the above details, though desirable,
has been absolutely necessary; for example, several claims have
been initiated by nothing more than the filing of a repair bill
with the clerk,12 while others have contained other facts but omit-
ted the amount of damages. Other practices which are peculiar
to letter claims will be mentioned as they arise in the further dis-
cussion of procedure.
Hearings. After the complaint is filed the assistant attorney
general decides whether or not to contest. If he decides to contest,
the clerk schedules a hearing before the referee, and when there
are enough disputed claims in one section of the state to make a
trip worthwhile, the referee and the assistant attorney general
travel to that section for the hearings, saving the claimants, their
attorneys, and the witnesses a trip to Frankfort.
The hearings, under the rules of the Board, can be upon the
testimony of witnesses or upon depositions, but in the latter case
only by order of the Board upon a finding that to do otherwise is
impracticable. In addition, the testimony of a witness may be
taken upon interrogatories after a proper showing before the
referee that the witness cannot be present and provided the evi-
dence so taken is not cumulative. An early claim indicates also
that a hearing may be had upon the law only, i.e., a stipulation of
facts with submission of the case to the referee on briefs as to a
disputed question of law.13
As in hearings before most administrative bodies, the rules of
evidence applicable in hearings before the referee are relaxed
somewhat from those applicable in an ordinary suit. The exact
bounds of admissible evidence are not clearcut; rather than aban-
"See Bd. of C1. #148 (1949); Bd. of C1. #149 (1949); Bd. of C1. #163
(1949); Bd. of C1. #388 (1951).2
'Bd. of C1. #18 (1948).
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don the legal rules of evidence altogether the Board has left their
application pretty much to the discretion of the referee:
Technical rules of evidence shall not be required but the
admission of testimony shall be to determine fairly, ex-
peditiously and economically the controversy, and to that
end follow as nearly as may be the established rules of
evidence and procedure as administered in the Courts of
Kentucky.14
The end result would seem to be that only legally competent
evidence should be admitted, so long as legally competent evi-
dence exists and is practicably obtainable. In the absence of some
legally competent evidence on a point in issue, something less
should be admitted, and a valid order may be based thereon.
In the hearing the referee sits as both judge and jury and is
specifically commanded by the rules of the Board to make separate
findings of law and fact. Nothing is contained in the Board rules
as to the weight of the findings, but the findings of fact would
seem to be considered prima facie correct, as are the findings of a
master. Certainly none of the referee's findings is conclusive, and
it is entirely possible that his findings are technically no more
weighty or conclusive than the findings of, say, an examiner for
the Motor Transportation Department. Whatever the actual rule,
it will be seen that for all practical purposes the Board gives great
weight bordering on conclusiveness to the referee's findings of
fact.
Upon his findings the referee files a report recommending an
award in a stated amount or a dismissal. Although such procedure
is not required by the Board, the referee as a matter of expediency
has been making a finding on the damages issue even in the cases
he recommends for dismissal. If the Board decides to overrule
him and make an award, an amount of damages ascertained by the
man who heard the testimony and observed the parties and wit-
nesses is in the record for the Board's guidance. The report of the
referee is much like a trial court's opinion when such an opinion
is written. The referee makes his findings of fact, discusses the
case and statutory law bearing on the controversy, and then draws
his conclusions as to the merits of the claim.
" Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Kentucky Board of Claims (1950).
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As might be expected, the larger a claim is the more likely it is
to be carried to a hearing. Very few claims for less than $50.00
have gone to a hearing, not only because of the expense, but also
and perhaps largely because of the unsuitability of a hearing to
claimants who are ordinarily not represented by counsel. No
petition existed in most small claims, and if the defendant asserted
an affirmative defense to which there had to be a reply within
fifteen days, the claimant was likely to be caught off guard. If a
small claim was taken to hearing, however, the claimant could
obtain counsel and let him assume responsibility from that point
forward. And in at least one claim, the referee treated an un-
represented claimant's appearance at the hearing as sufficient reply
to a defense. 5
Nonhearing claims-settlements and stipulations. About 356
of the first 500 claims did not go to a hearing before the referee,
either on oral testimony or deposition, so these nonhearing claims
are numerically more important in a discussion of Board pro-
cedures than the hearing claims. This is rather unusual in view
of the fact that no provision is made either in the Board of Claims
Act or in the rules of the Board for settlement of claims, it ap-
parently being contemplated that all claims be heard by the Board
or its representative, the referee.
Since there is no provision giving the assistant attorney general
power to settle or compromise a claim, theoretically each claim
must go from the initial pleading to judgment by the Board ir-
respective of the certainty of the state's liability. Often claims
arise which if brought against a private corporation would be
promptly settled to avoid the unnecessary expense of litigation.
An assistant attorney general cannot technically settle a claim as
counsel for a corporation might, but a fairly standard procedure
for achieving the same result has evolved from the practice of
defending claims against the Highway Department.
The evolution began in the early days of the Board when the
assistant attorney general, having decided not to contest a claim
but lacking the power simply to settle, would typically file an
answer admitting liability but denying the amount of damages.
Then upon receiving some adequate proof of the amount of dam-
'Bd. of C1. #533 (1953).
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ages, he would file a pleading confessing judgment for that amount
and the claim would be sent to the Board on the pleadings.10
Until the processing of claim number 68-filed one year after
the first claim-the referee did not report on claims unless there
was a hearing. Procedure for reaching a settlement had become
lax immediately previous to claim 68-often no answer at all was
filed-and it was apparently this laxity which prompted the change.
Beginning with claim 68 and continuing to the present, the referee
has usually filed a report setting forth the facts and his recom-
mendation whether the claim has been contested or not and ir-
respective of the amount of damages.
With the development of the practice of the referee's reporting
on nonhearing claims, the need arose for some material upon
which he could base his recommendations. The use of stipulations
resulted. The demand for stipulations in nonhearing claims came
from the referee, not from the rules of the Board, and was evi-
dently for the referee's own protection. Generally the use of stipu-
lations has been limited to claims for over $50.00. Because of the
function they serve, the stipulations of fact prepared by the as-
sistant attorney general are not strictly the same thing as stipula-
tions employed by counsel in court suits. They do not serve solely
to remove agreed issues of fact from the realm of litigation, leav-
ing only the disputed issues for the judge or jury. In the Board of
Claims practice, they replace the hearing completely when used.
Of course in many claims the facts stipulated are those which the
assistant attorney general actually believes to be the true facts.
" This procedure has resulted in claims which on their face appear to have
been handled loosely although in fact allowance of the claims may have been
completely warranted. For example, one petition made no allegation of acts of
negligence but instead of demurring, the assistant attorney general answered, "No
defense." Bd. of Cl. #77 (1947). In another claim it appears from the record
that the assistant attorney general or his staff drew up the petition for the claimant
after receiving a letter in which claimant stated the facts. Bd. of C1. #129
(1949). Another time, a stipulation of facts signed by the parties served as the
pleadings. Bd. of Cl. #150 (1949); see also Bd. of Cl. #194 (1950). Even
jurisdictional defects have been ignored-the assistant attorney general admitted
allegations of petition which predicated relief upon an implied contract, then
stipulated facts from which negligence appeared. Bd. of Cl. #116 (1948). In
some claims the necessity of going through the motions of litigation when the as-
sistant attorney general is willing to settle has been costly. For example a claimant
by letter sought $553.00 damages for injuries to himself and his wagon and mule.
He was informed that although liability was admitted a petition would be neces-
sary. Back came a petition, but this time damages asked were $2165.00. After a
hearing over the disputed damages, claimant was awarded $769.00-still more than
$200.00 above his original request Bd. of Cl. #167 (1951).
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Sometimes, however, it may be that the assistant attorney general
is not completely satisfied that his department is liable, but in
order to avoid the chance of losing a claim for a large amount of
damage he may be willing to compromise and agree to liability
for reduced damages. Thus facts may be stipulated which are in
issue for the purpose of affording the referee a set of facts from
which he can easily infer negligence on the part of the Depart-
ment.
The "typical" nonhearing claim now takes this form: answer
is filed stating "no defense" or admitting the allegations; a stipula-
tion of facts and usually of damages is signed by the parties (after
negotiation) ; the pleadings and stipulation are sent to the referee
who finds negligence from the facts and recommends an award.17
The introduction of the stipulation into the practice before
the Board did not replace all other evidence in nonhearing claims,
although if a stipulation is filed the referee will be guided by it
without any supporting evidence. If a stipulation is not filed,
reference may be made by the referee to the reports on the acci-
dent in question' or to affidavits filed by the claimant.19 And
there is no inherent lack of power to prevent the referee from
recommending an award on the pleadings only20 since the Board
has confirmed many claims on the pleadings without a referee's
report.
Since the decision whether to deny or admit the allegations of
a claimant rests with the assistant attorney general, it is important
to know the facts and evidence upon which the assistant attorney
general relies in making this decision. When an accident occurs
which involves the Highway Department a report is filed by a
safety supervisor or district engineer or both. In these reports
there is generally an opinion expressed as to who was at fault,
and the district engineer recommends that the Department assume
or reject liability. That great weight is placed upon these reports,
especially the district engineer's, is indicated by the fact that the
conclusions of the assistant attorney general to contest or settle
are seldom contrary to the recommendations. In addition to this
'7For example, see Bd. of C1. #174 (1950); Bd. of Cl. #294 (1951); Bd. of
Cl. #453 (1951); Bd. of C1. #616 (1953).1
"Bd. of CL. #307 (1951).
"Bd. of C1. #569 (1953).
'Bd. of C1. #95 (1948).
KENTucKy LAw JomuAL
information there are sometimes police reports, and facts turned
up by the assistant attorney general's own investigation, if any.
For the amount of damages, most reliance is placed upon repair
bills and similar evidence of damage submitted by the claimant.
If the damage is less tangible, such as for personal injuries, affi-
davits are often submitted in addition to doctors' and medical
bills for the assistant attorney general's consideration.
Board action. It is the Board that gives legal significance and
value to a claim by either "allowing" or rejecting it. The Board
of Claims Act requires:
An award or judgment shall be made only after considera-
tion of the facts surrounding the matter in controversy, and
no award or judgment shall be made unless the board is of
the opinion that the damage claimed was caused by such
negligence on the part of the Commonwealth... as would
entitle claimant to a judgment in an action at law if the
state were amenable to such action.21
Attending the meetings at which the Board makes its decisions
are the assistant attorneys general who have represented the de-
fendant agencies, the clerk of the Board, and the referee. Attor-
neys representing clients whose claims are up for consideration
may also attend but ordinarily do not-perhaps as much from
ignorance of the procedure as from lack of interest.
The procedure of the Board can best be described by briefly
considering it first from the standpoint of hearing claims and then
from the standpoint of nonhearing claims.
Hearing claims. For contested claims, unless an error appears
on the face of the record, the referee's recommendation will be
changed by the Board only if exceptions accompanied by a memo-
randum explaining the grounds are filed within twenty days after
the referee's report is filed.22 Copies of the exceptions and memo-
randum must be furnished the other side.2 3 In considering the
claims the Board is somewhat analogous to an appellate court ex-
cept that the Board is freer to make its own findings of fact. The
referee, assistant attorney general and claimant's attorney, if pres-
ent, may be questioned. Although some portions of the evidence
ItKy. REv. STAT. 44.120 (1953).
'Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Kentucky Board of Claims (1950).
Ibid.
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may be considered, the record as a whole is seldom read by all
members. The claims records are usually apportioned to the three
members of the Board equally. Each one reads the records of the
claims assigned to him and then states these cases orally to the
Board. After a case is stated the Board members express their
opinions of the validity of the claim (the Chairman Associate
Judge member usually takes the initiative and the others assent
or dissent, in which latter case very informal discussion will follow
until a decision agreeable to all members is reached).
Irrespective of the Board action taken, whether the referee's
report is approved, modified or rejected, no opinion is written and
reasons for the action are not in any way expressed beyond what
is said (but not recorded) at the meeting. After the meeting, the
clerk of the Board prepares the appropriate orders which, when
signed by the chairman of the Board, authorize the Commissioner
of Finance to draw warrants upon the State Treasurer for their
payment.2 4
Appeal. Appeal may be taken from the Board action to the
Franklin Circuit Court within thirty days if the claim exceeds
$50.00.25 The statute provides that the method of appeal shall
follow section 724 subsction 1 of the Civil Code. This section has
since been repealed, but is substantially replaced by Rule 72.01
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Further limitations on an appeal
are imposed by paragraph 2 of Ky. REv. STAT. 44.140, which pro-
vides:
On appeal no new evidence may be introduced except as to
fraud or misconduct of some person engaged in the hearing
before the Board. The Court shall hear the cause upon the
record before it and dispose of the appeal in a summary
manner, being limited in determining: Whether or not the
Board acted without or in excess of its powers; the award
or judgment was procured by fraud; the award or judg-
ment is not in conformity to the provisions of KRS 44.070
to 44.160; and whether the findings of fact support the
award or judgment.
There have been surprisingly few appeals from the action of
the Board to the Franklin Circuit Court. Of the first 500 claims
only sixteen have been appealed. This may be explained by the
'Ky. BEV. STAT. 44.100 (1953).
' Ky. REv. STAT. 44.140 (1953).
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fact that, as noted above, the grounds for appeal are relatively
narrow. In addition to the restraints imposed on the Circuit
Court's review by the statute, the Court of Appeals has held that
the findings of the Board may not be altered so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. Even so, six of these sixteen
appeals have been successful, although one was subsequently re-
versed on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The only other re-
versal by Franklin Circuit Court which was appealed was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals on a question of law.
Nonhearing claims. The Board acts in a sort of supervisory
capacity in reviewing the noncontested claims. The only such
claims which reach the Board are in favor of the claimant and
agreed to by both parties, since any claims to which the assistant
attorneys general remain adverse will either be dismissed by the
claimant or be taken to a hearing. Thus no exceptions will be
filed and about the only thing for the Board to decide is whether
it approves of the practice the assistant attorney general has fol-
lowed. The most it can do in this respect is to see that substantial
evidence supports the assistant attorney general's admission of the
allegations or his answer of "no defense," the stipulation of facts,
and the amount of damages he agreed to. At the January 1953
Board meeting even this supervisory power was in effect abdicated
to the assistant attorneys general when the Board decided that as
a matter of procedure at Board meetings they would not look to
the evidence behind the stipulations entered into by the claimant
and the assistant attorneys general, but would accept the facts and
amount of damage stipulated as true and warranted. Noncon-
tested claims can now be approved by the Board in as much time
as it takes the member who states the case to report that the
stipulation contains facts from which negligence of the defendant
agency appears, and that the damages agreed to seem reasonable.26
Except for reversals to the extent of lowering or rejecting
damages for loss of use, the Board rarely has refused to follow the
referee's recommendation in noncontested claims. Statistics show
in fact that in any claim, contested or not, chances are overwhelm-
ingly in favor of the Board's acceptance of the referee's report in
However, in the past, the Board has been particularly strict about allowing
damages for loss of use of a vehicle. In all probability this attitude will continue
and compensation for loss of use will be allowed only upon the presentation of
satisfactory evidence to substantiate the claim.
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toto. Of the first 500 claims, reversal of the referee's recommenda-
tion occurred only twenty seven times-seventeen times on the
question of liability of the defendant, ten times on the findings as
to the amount of damages. There have been no remands to the
referee by the Board-proof of the effectiveness of the referee's
practice of finding a tentative amount of damages in claims for
which he recommends dismissal.
Res Adjudicata and Stare Decisis
Since the Board of Claims is an administrative agency the
doctrines of res adjudicata and stare decisis do not necessarily
apply in the exact way they apply in a court of law. Some adminis-
trative agencies can deny a claim or application yet hear the same
claim or application a year later and grant it. The two general
reasons for this are (1) the facts upon which the claim is made
may have changed; (2) granting the claim or application, al-
though possibly the outcome of a hearing which is at least quasi-
judicial, is primarily a legislative function in which a right is given
and not merely enforced.27 It is seen that neither of the reasons
applies to claims before the Board. The facts of a claim will not
change; like any charge of negligence the claim is decided on past
facts. And making the award is essentially judicial, not legislative.
Except for the traditional immunity accorded a sovereign, a
claimant would have an ordinary cause of action in a court of law.
When the immunity is voluntarily removed by the legislature the
claimant and sovereign are on the footing of plaintiff and de-
fendant.
In claims before the Board, then, the doctrine of res adjudicata
should apply as fully as it does in a circuit court. To some extent,
possibly completely, depending upon the construction given it,
Ky. Riv. STAT. 44.160 provides that the doctrine applies:
Any action prosecuted to judgment under the provisions of
KRS 44.070 to 44.160 shall preclude the right of such claim-
ant to sue the Commonwealth... in any other forum.
It is not clear whether the statute refers to judgments of the
Board or judgments of the Franklin Circuit Court. The orders
of the Board are referred to in the statute as "awards or judg-
I DAvIs, Ar.mqismAnrvE LAw, 594-604 (1951).
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ments," and it may be intended that a Board order be a bar.
Presumably although a later claim before the Board is not ex-
pressly forbidden prosecution to judgment also precludes any
later claim on the same facts before the Board. And if prosecution
to judgment precludes the right to sue in another forum it should
make it useless to apply for a special act granting permission to
sue in another forum.
In the claims filed to date no problem of res adjudicata has
arisen, and thus no questions have been answered. Perhaps some
light is thrown on the problem, however, by two claims filed by
the same claimant. One accident occurred in which the claimant
suffered both personal and property damage. Two claims were
filed seeking the different types of damages in order to escape the
then existing $1,000 maximum recoverable sum. The allegations
of the first claim 28 were denied, but in the second claim, filed at
the same time, the assistant attorney general specially demurred
on the ground that the claim was based on the same facts as the
first, amounting to a split cause of action. WNithout any action by
the Board, the claimant amended his first claim to include the
damages of the second and was paid the maximum amount for
his single claim.29 In a state holding that a plaintiff has separate
causes of action for personal and property damage caused by only
one tortious transaction, the claimant could have maintained these
claims separately. If he cannot in a state like Kentucky where
only one cause of action exists, it must be because of the doctrine
of res adjudicata.
For what they are worth two more claims might be mentioned.
Both claims arose out of one accident-one was by a husband for
personal injuries, the other by the wife for damages to her car.
The husband claimed a small amount of damages, in fact only his
medical expenses. The wife also claimed a seemingly small
amount-$200.00, when the repair bill showed the damage to her
car was $1,866.00. It did not appear that insurance covered the
remainder. Evidence that the Department was at fault was weak;
the district engineer's report without recommendations gave the
impression that the claimant was at fault. Yet answers admitting
' Bd. of Cl. #50 (1949).
Bd. of Cl. #53 (1949). For a case holding the Kentucky law to be that
only one cause of action exists when one tortious act causes personal and property
damage, see Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 785, 185 S.W. 129 (1916). ,
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the allegations were filed in both claims, possibly with the attitude
that it would be wise to allow the small amounts claimed and fore-
close both claimants from any later attempt to recover their full
damages. The significant fact in each claim was the Board action:
recovery was allowed both times but in each award the Board
made it clear that the awards were full settlement for any claims
the claimants might have-something the Board never before or
after bothered to do.30 One inference that might be drawn from
the Board action is that if res adjudicata in its ordinary legal sense
applied it would be unnecessary for the Board to frame the award
in terms of a release. On the other hand, in the absence of the
applicability of the doctrine of res adjudicata, the power of the
Board to foreclose any future claims on the same facts simply by
making one award could well be questioned.
A more fundamental problem is the one of stare decisis, but
here the problem is not so much whether and to what extent it
applies, but how to effectuate its application. Ky. REv. STAT.
44.120 provides:
No award or judgment shall be made unless the Board is
of the opinion that the damage claimed was caused by such
negligence on the part of the Commonwealth or its agents
as would entitle the claimant to a judgment in an action at
law if the state were amenable to such action.
Thus as to principles of law there can be no doubt that the Board
is bound to follow the existing laws of the state.
Were it not for the fact that all questions of law have not been
decided by the Court of Appeals and that the referee sits as both
judge and jury, the problem would be solved by the above statu-
tory provision. If a question of law is presented to the referee on
which he can find no applicable decision he must decide the ques-
tion with whatever tools exist. Should the same question arise
later, however, the referee must rely upon his memory to take him
to his earlier decision. At this moment the number of claims filed
has passed the 700 mark. With any change in personnel these
decided claims will become almost totally useless as precedents
because there is no filing system beyond the numerical order in
which the claims are filed in the clerk's office, and a combination
alphabetical-numerical order system of duplicate files in the as-
sistant attorney general's office.
' See Bd. of C1. #393 (1951) and Bd. of C1. #394 (1951).
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Since the factual questions presented in all claims which go to
a hearing are decided by the same jury (the referee), there ought
to be considerable internal consistency in the decision of these
many questions. Several decided claims will serve to illustrate
that the contrary is sometimes true. Two different claimants
sought damages sustained in two separate but similar accidents.
Both claimants had opened their car doors into the path of De-
partment trucks. In one claim 3' the answer was "no defense" and
the referee recommended payment. After a hearing on the other
claim, the referee recommended dismissal, finding the claimant
contributorily negligent in opening his car door.32 In both claims,
contributory negligence in opening the car doors would have
been a jury question if suit had been in a Circuit Court, and in
like manner opposite results might have been reached by separate
juries. But under the jury system differing results cannot be
avoided, while they can to some extent be avoided when the same
person is deciding all the cases.
In two other claims the fact situations seem identical. In each
case slow-moving highway equipment was being operated over the
crest of a hill, out of sight of oncoming cars and without warning
signs. In each case the claimant could not see the equipment until
it was too late to stop, yet in one claim recovery was allowed,33
while in the other the referee found that the claimant should have
been in sufficient control of his car to stop within range of his
vision, and for a failure to do so was contributorily negligent.34
Whether the ruling was one of fact or of law, it would seem de-
sirable to reach the same result in both claims in the absence of
some variation in material fact.
The problem of consistency will become more serious as the
number of claims mounts, and with each change of personnel.
There are at least two solutions to the problem, one of which
would be to introduce into the methods of the Board a workable
index and filing system so that claims previously decided on law
or facts similar to one in the process of decision could be located.
While this procedure would certainly alleviate the existing situa-
tion, it has enough shortcomings to make the effort necessary for
'Bd. of C1. #317 (1951).
' Bd. of C1. #364 (1952).
'Bd. of C1. #449 (1952).
"Bd. of C1. #337 (1952).
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its effectuation relatively unprofitable. The other solution is pub-
lication of the more significant awards with the referee's reports
and reconmendations. Although this solution is more expensive,
it will be seen that publication would not only solve the con-
sistency problem, but at the same time might help cure some of
the other ills of the Board's development, minor though they have
been. The immediate burden of presenting precedents would be
put upon counsel for the claimant instead of upon the referee or
an assistant hired for that purpose. And it stands to reason that
with the bar as a whole knowing the work of the Board, the ad-
ministration of claims would be strengthened as a matter of
pride.35
Substantive Law of the Board of Claims
Since the Board's jurisdiction is limited to compensating per-
sons for damages "sustained to either person or property as a
proximate result of negligence on the part of the commonwealth,
any of its departments or agencies, or any of its agents or em-
ployees while acting within the scope of their employment ...,36
the substantive law of negligence and related problems are the
chief points of discussion here. Prior to 1950 the jurisdiction of
the Board was restricted to claims arising out of the negligence of
employees or agents of the Highway Department, 37 but it has
been extended to cover the negligence of any state agency or em-
ployee.
This study of substantive content of claims has been limited
to the first 600 claims filed with the Board.38 Approximately 250
of these were filed before June 15, 1950, the effective date of the
new Board of Claims Act, and thus are necessarily against the
Highway Department. Even so, of the next 350 claims, filed when
' In a comparatively recent study of federal administrative procedure, the
reporting of opinions signed by ICC examiners was approved with emphasis of the
point that such procedure gave the examiners an added sense of responsibility
and improved the work of the Commission. Afionograph, Interstate Commerce
Commission, Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 26-37
(1941).
"Ky. REV. STAT. 44.070 (1953).
' Ky. REv. STAT. 176.290 (1948). At the same time the jurisdiction was
extended to cover all agencies, the jurisdictional maximum was raised from $1,000
to $5,000.
'Some of these 600 are not yet completed but they have progressed far
enough for the purposes of the discussion. Beyond the 600 mark, most of the
claims have not developed enough to be considered in any figures or percentages.
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all agencies were amenable to suit, only forty-six are against
agencies other than the Highway Department. For this reason the
substantive law of the Board will be discussed briefly under the
main categories: claims against the Highway Department and
claims against other agencies.
Highway Department. (a) Collision Claims. As might be ex-
pected, claims arising from the negligent operation of Department
vehicles constitute the bulk of litigation before the Board. Of
the first 554 claims filed against the Highway Department, 344
were for injuries arising from collisions between a Department
vehicle and the claimant, his auto, or the auto in which he was
riding-all typical highway negligence cases. Negligent acts or
omissions included in these claims are, inter alia, defective
brakes;39 defective steering mechanism;40 stopping without sig-
naling;41 failure to stop at intersection;42 driving while intoxi-
cated;43 pulling equipment which was wider than one lane of
the highway without proper precautions; 44 following a car too
closely; 43 and pulling onto the road without looking.46 Such situa-
tions are not unlike those in which private persons are the parties
and thus little difficulty has been encountered in applying ordi-
nary negligence principles to this type of claim.
(b) Highway Defects. Comparatively few claims-sixty-seven
of the first 554--were filed against the Department for injuries
proximately resulting from defects in the highways. It may be
that few persons suffer damage because of defects-that highway
defects perhaps create more aggravation than tangible, compen-
sable injury. Another factor behind the small amount of claims
might be the difficulty of proof. Proximate cause, though as direct
as in a collision-type accident, is less easily demonstrated.
Since private persons do not maintain highways, direct analogies
to ordinary tort law are nonexistent except where there is some
similarity to the duty of a municipal corporation to maintain its
streets. It may be helpful, therefore, to analyze a few of the claims
"Bd. of C1. #4 (1946).
"Bd. of C1. #13 (1947).
' Bd. of C1. #23 (1947).
' Bd. of C1. #40 (1947).
"Bd. of C1. #85 (1948).
" Bd. of C1. #372 (1952).
"Bd. of C1. #395 (1951).
" Bd. of C1. #576 (1953).
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to determine the extent of the Department's duty in maintaining
highways.
On the basis of decided claims it is clear that the Department
has a duty either to correct or warn of defects in the traveled
surface of the highway.47 But where the defect arises because of
vis major no duty arises until the Department receives notice. 48
The same requirement of notice applies also where the defect is
one which develops through ordinary use of the highway, such as
a hole which grows larger and larger as each vehicle pounds
over it until it becomes dangerous. The Department is not an in-
surer.49 However, one claim indicates that the familiar doctrine
of constructive notice applies in such cases, i.e., when a defect has
existed long enough for a prudent person with the duty to main-
tain to have obtained notice, the Department will be held to have
had notice irrespective of the actual fact °0
Logically no notice should be required when the existence of
the defect results from negligence. Generally the Board has fol-
lowed this theory; for example, no proof of notice was required
in a claim involving injury due to debris negligently left in the
highway by the Department.5' Likewise liability was admitted
when damages were sought as a result of claimant's collision with
a rock alleged to have been left negligently on the road by a De-
partment bulldozer operator.12
The dispositions of a few claims seem inconsistent with the
above principles. In one, the claimant's car hit what was termed
a "blow-up" in the pavement, evidently caused by a change in the
temperature. The "blow-up" had occurred just before the acci-
dent, so the Department could hardly have had notice. The claim
was small and filed by a letter which failed to allege notice and
duty to maintain the particular highway. Since a petition was un-
necessary, this failure was not fatal . 3 Nevertheless, duty and
notice should have in fact existed. The assistant attorney general
admitted liability in his answer, possibly not realizing that the im-
'
1Bd. of CI. #79 (1948).
"Bd. of Cl. #185 (1950).
" Bd. of Cl. #120 (1949).
' Bd. of Cl. #89 (1948).
' Bd. of Cl. #50 (1949); Bd. of Cl. #51 (1949); Bd. of Cl. #52 (1949).
" Bd. of CL. # 275 (1950).
'A petition has been subject to demurrer for failure to allege notice, Bd. of
Cl. #222 (1953), or duty to maintain, Bd. of Cl. #303 (1950).
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plication of the answer is that the Department has a duty to
exercise that degree of care in selecting materials for and in build-
ing a highway surface which will prevent "blow-ups"-a burden-
some duty approaching that of an insurer.5 4
In a later claim damages were asked for repairs made necessary
when the claimant's car allegedly hit a hole in the highway. The
district engineer reported that no hole could be found, proof that
the Department did not have notice of the defect if one in fact
existed. Nor was there any fact offered which showed the Depart-
ment should have had notice. The claim was small, however, and
the defense admitted liability for half the damages claimed. 5
A problem that has given the Board some trouble and which
produced a rather unusual situation is the "breadth" of the De-
partment's duty to maintain a highway-whether it has a duty to
maintain the shoulders of a highway as well as the traveled surface.
There is a conflict in the outcome of the first two claims filed for
damages growing out of accidents caused by highway shoulder
defects. The first such claim was dismissed by the Board56 and
appealed to Franklin Circuit Court, where the Board's ruling was
affirmed. The second claim was also dismissed by the Board, con-
trary to the referee's recommendation, but on appeal to Franklin
Circuit Court the Board's order was reversed and an award
entered.5 7 Later claims have followed the disposition of the second
claim, the Department being held to the same duty to maintain
shoulders as it has to maintain the traveled surface.58
In the meantime, however, the first claim decided by the Board,
in regard to this duty was being appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In 1952 by a four-to-three decision the Court of Appeals an-
nounced the rule to be that the state is not liable for its failure
to maintain the shoulders of a highway in a reasonably safe con-
dition for travel except as to defects which are obscured from the
view of the ordinary traveler and which are so inherently danger-
ous as to constitute traps.59 The judgment of the Franklin Circuit
Court affirming the Board's dismissal of the claim was affirmed.
"Bd. of Cl. #176 (1949).
' Bd. of Cl. #396 (1951).
' Bd. of Cl. #178 (1950).
'Bd. of Cl. #227 (1950).
'See Bd. of Cl. #313 (1952); Bd. of Cl. #314 (1952).
Dillingham v. Department of Highways et al., 253 S.W. 2d 256 (Ky. 1952).
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Presumably the rule announced by the Court of Appeals will be
followed by the Board in the future. The few claimants who filed
between the institution of the first analogous claim and the final
Court of Appeals decision on that claim can consider themselves
fortunate.
In view of the slight duty imposed upon the Department in
regard to highway shoulders, it is highly unlikely that any duty to
a motorist would be put upon the Department regarding the main-
tenance of ditches and the remainder of the right-of-way. The
two claims asserting such a duty were dismissed. In one a claimant
contended a ditch into which he careened was negligently main-
tained-evidently aggravating his damages. The Board sustained a
general demurrer, probably because they felt it would be un-
reasonable to require the maintenance of ditches which would
receive careening cars with reasonable safety.60
Injuries to land. In Kentucky, under the "reverse eminent do-
main" theory, the state may be sued in circuit court without any
legislative waiver of sovereign immunity when land has been
"taken" within the contemplation of section 13 of the Constitu-
tion.01 Although intentional acts are usually the basis of such
suits, some negligent acts have also been held to constitute a "tak-
ing."'6 2 Such negligent acts might give rise either to a cause of
action in the circuit courts under this theory or to a negligence
claim before the Board. About twenty-one such claims have been
filed with the Board. The negligence complained of in these
claims includes maintenance of a faulty drainage system for high-
ways which caused claimant's land to flood;6 3 improper highway
construction which damaged claimant's spring and well;64 and the
IBd. of Cl. #485 (1951). See also Bd. of Cl. #186 (1951) in which
claimant's car wheel dropped over a hidden culvert extending beyond the shoulder
as claimant left a drive-in theatre. The claim was dismissed.
I For cases in which the theory is applied, see Keck et al. v. Hafley, 237 S.W.
2d 527 (Ky. 1951); Commonwealth et al. v. Kelley et al., 314 Ky. 581, 236 S.W.
2d 695 (1951). The theory is discussed in some detail in the second article of
this series in 42 Ky. L. J. 168 (1954).
See for example Department of Highways v. Corey, 247 S.W. 2d 389 (Ky.
1952) (negligent construction of highway culvert resulting in inundation of the
plaintiff's property).
" Bd. of C1. #32 (1947), special demurrer sustained by the Board because
claimant sought an injunction in addition to damages, a remedy beyond thejurisdiction of the Board.
" Bd. of Cl. #88 (1948), allowed.
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most common complaint, highway blasting which damaged claim-
ants' land.65
The Board's jurisdiction to make an award in cases of negli-
gent "taking" has not been questioned. There has been some
hesitancy on the part of the Board itself to entertain this type of
claim, however. At the January 1953 Board meeting at least one
claim which might have been brought in circuit court was post-
poned for later decision in order that the Board could more fully
consider the theory of reverse eminent domain. About the only
argument that can be put forth in favor of a refusal by the Board
to entertain these claims is that the legislature may have intended
the Board to have jurisdiction only over complaints which cannot
otherwise be redressed without the consent of the legislature.6
The result of such an interpretation, however, would be to create
confusion and delay if a claimant guessed wrong on the question
of whether or not his claim comes within the theory of reverse
eminent domain. In view of the many claims already allowed,
and the lack of a strong reason for denying jurisdiction over these
claims, there is little doubt but that the Board will continue to
entertain them.67 It is a benefit to the citizen to have a more
speedy remedy and at the same time the inflexibility of the remedy
in circuit courts can be avoided.68
Other negligence. Among the 554 claims filed against the
Highway Department, about 96 have been for general acts of
negligence not included in the above categories. The bulk of
these claims involves run-of-the-mill negligence situations such as
'Bd. of Cl. #100 (1948); Bd. of Cl. #196 (1950); Bd. of Cl. #226 (1950);
Bd. of Cl. #301 (1952). All of these claims were successful.
'About the only basis on which such an argument could rest is Ky. REv.
STAT. 44.120 (1953) which provides in so many words that an award by the
Board can be made only when the damage claimed was caused by such negligence
on the part of the Commonwealth as would entitle claimant to a judgment if the
state were amenable to an action at law. It could be implied from this that the
act was intended to cover only those situations in which the state is not otherwise
amenable to suit. An obvious answer, however, is that the act speaks in terms of
amenability to action at law for negligence. The reverse eminent domain actions
are not predicated on negligence as such, but are to recover damages for an un-
constitutional "taking."
' Indeed, if either the Board or the circuit courts must lose their jurisdiction
over these claims (both will probably continue to hear them) the act would seem
to oust the circuit courts of their jurisdiction. See the discussion infra, page *.
' Under the theory of reverse eminent domain, since the suit is in the nature
of an eminent domain proceeding, the plaintiff does not obtain damages, he obtains
the value of the land "taken." For a fuller discussion of this theory, see 42 Ky.
L. J. 163 (1954).
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a Department truck's backing into a claimant's mailbox.6 9 But
among these claims are several which are rather unique and illus-
trative of what may be considered negligence by the Board. Re-
covery has been allowed when, inter alia, a Department employee
threw a shovelful of gravel across a road as a car passed, striking
the car's windshield; 70 a Department truck, left unsecured in a
garage, rolled out and struck claimant's car; 71 brush extending
from a Department truck struck the aerial on claimant's car; 72
a chain hanging from the back of a Department truck swung out,
hitting the claimant's car;73 a Department truck hit an overhang-
ing limb, knocking it down onto claimant's auto;74 a highway
marker sign fell from a lamp post onto claimant's head;75 gravel
fell out of a Department truck, striking the claimant's vehicle; 76
sparks from a right-of-way clearing fire flew onto the claimant's
passing truckload of hay; 77 and a spike used to secure a traffic
counting cable came loose and was picked up by the claimant's
tire, injuring the tire.78
Other agencies. It has been noted that only 350 of the first 600
claims have been filed since agencies other than the Highway De-
partment have been made amenable to suit, and that of these 350
claims only forty six have been filed against other agencies. Bar-
ring one unfortunate accident this figure, small as it is, would be
reduced by one-third. That accident-the collapse of a foot-bridge
in Carter Cave Park-produced fourteen claims before the Board
against the Department of Conservation, all of which were allowed
after the defense admitted liability in the first claim.79 The re-
maining thirty-two claims were filed as follows: against the State
Police Department-seven; against the Department of Conserva-
tion-nine; against the Department of Welfare-five; against the
Department of Agriculture-two; against the Military Department
-two; against the Public Service Commission-one; and against
'Bd. of CI. #106 (1948).
" Bd. of C1. #61 (1947).
'nBd. of C1. # 140 (1949).
"Bd. of CI. #147 (1949).
"Bd. of C1. #156 (1949).
Bd. of C1. #305 (1951).
"Bd. of C1. #315 (1951).
B"d. of C1. #400 (1951).
"Bd. of C1. #1 (1946).
"Bd. of C1. #485 (1952).
'See Bd. of C1. #279-#292 (1951).
KmTcKY LAW JOURNAL
the Department of Finance-six. The bulk of these claims were
for collisions on the highway. But among the few that are not
are a claim for injuries sustained when the claimant fell down
steps negligently maintained in a state park,80 and one for the
death by electrocution of one of the defendant agency's em-
ployees."'
On the basis of so few claims little can be said concerning
trends, procedural differences, etc., but one natural consequence
which appears from the decided claims might be noted: since the
other agencies have so few claims filed against them, an individual
claim is apt to get more resistance than an individual claim against
the Highway Department.
Strict liability and intentional acts of "negligence." There re-
mains a group of claims which perhaps should be taken up else-
where, but which will be discussed here as possible extensions of
the substantive law of the Board of Claims. These are the claims
in which the facts or the interpretation of the facts shows an
absence of negligence-not because of a failure of proof, but simply
because something other than negligence caused the damage.
A class of claims in point is the "blasting claims." In some of
these negligence was in fact the cause,82 while in others negligence
was not apparent or clearly recognized, yet was possibly present.83
But in several "blasting claims," whether negligence might have
existed or not, the referee obviously recommended payment under
the theory of absolute or strict liability without regard to any
negligence. In two claims, negligence was never alleged, admitted,
stipulated or found to exist. In one of these the referee expressly
predicated his recommendation of payment, which was confirmed
by the Board, on the theory of absolute liability.84 In the other
the Board ordered payment on the pleadings and stipulation with-
out a referee's report.85 The referee actually made a finding of no
negligence in another claim, but nevertheless recommended pay-
ment of stipulated damages.86
' Bd. of Cl. #350 (1951).
'Bd. of Cl. #319 (1951).
'For example, see Bd. of Cl. #196 (1950); Bd. of Cl. #285 (1950); Bd. of
Cl. #259 (1951).
See Bd. of Cl. #226 (1950) where the referee recommended payment on
the basis of negligence as alleged.
' Bd. of CL. #496 (1952).
'Bd. of CL. #264 (1950).
' Bd. of Cl. #100 (1948). See also Bd. of Cl. #551 (1952), in which dam-
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It cannot be denied that persons suffering injuries by reason
of culpable blasting should be allowed some remedy, but the
Board of Claims is exceeding its statutory power when it affords
that remedy without a showing by the claimant of negligence.
Fortunately the previously mentioned theory of "reverse eminent
domain" action can fill the gap in most cases,s7 although it would
seem wise to amend the act to allow payment of these claims by
the Board.
A class of claims related to the "blasting claims" involves in-
tentional torts. From one claim it appeared that the Highway
Department reconstructed a road on property previously conveyed
to it by the claimant. The grade of the new road was raised, mak-
ing the claimant's driveway useless. His claim for damages was
apparently predicated on the theory of an interference with his
ingress and egress. Negligence was not alleged and properly so
because the damage did not result from negligent construction; it
flowed from the intentional, careful construction of the road. An
answer asserting lack of negligence was filed, but it was followed
by a stipulation of facts and $200 damages. Payment was recom-
mended and awarded, the issue of negligence never being faced.s8
Another claim, perhaps even more illustrative of the point here
made, was filed against the Department of Conservation, Division
of Game and Fish. 9 The Division's employee, a game warden,
shot the claimant, a game law violator, allegedly in the process of
arresting him. The shooting was obviously intentional-defenses
raised were justifications under the law of arrest and self-defense.
After a hearing the referee recommended dismissal, finding the
shooting justified. The Board confirmed, but upon appeal to
Franklin Circuit Court, where the parties argued only the law of
arrest and self-defense, the order of the Board was reversed and
the claimant was awarded the jurisdictional maximum, $5,000.
The claim was appealed further to the Court of Appeals where
ages caused by blasting were allowed because the state is "absolutely liable" under
Rylands v. Fletcher.
' If the blasting is part of a road-building or other public project, the property
owners can recover in circuit court against either the county, the Department or
the contractor, depending upon the circumstances of the case. See Combs v.
Codell Construction Co., 244 Ky. 772, 52 S.W. 2d 719 (1932); Hall v. Ellis and
Brantley, 238 Ky. 114, 36 S.W. 2d 850 (1931).
' Bd. of Cl. #378 (1951).
'Bd. of Cl. #367 (1952). For a claim in which recovery was allowed to
redress an intentional trespass, see Bd. of Cl. #461 (1952).
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the Board's order was reinstated, but the ruling of the court was
based on the fact that the Board's finding of justification was sup-
ported by substantial evidence and thus could not be disturbed by
Franklin Circut Court.90 The jurisdictional issue of lack of negli-
gence of a state agency or employee seems never to have been
raised.
Some Observations on the Board of Claims
Under the present statute no awards may be made unless the
Board is of the opinion that the damage claimed was caused by
such negligence of the Commonwealth as would entitle claimant
to a judgment in an action at law if the state were amenable to
suits.91 When and if an award is made without proof of negligence
the Board is exceeding its power.
In present practice there are two sorts of cases in which the
Board occasionally makes awards which are of doubtful statutory
validity-the first, some cases in which the assistant attorney gen-
eral has decided to "settle" and second, cases of intentional "negli-
gence." The latter, which have already been discussed, are infre-
quent; enough such claims have not been allowed to indicate any
settled practice. Responsible for those which have been allowed
is a commendable desire to compensate those persons who deserve
to recover from the standpoint of common justice. Unfortunately
if they have been injured by something other than negligence, the
end result is an attempt to hammer an intentional tort, or a care-
ful act which nevertheless carries with it absolute liability, into
negligent conduct. In some few claims no such attempt has been
made-the issue of negligence seems simply to have been ignored.
The remedy is simple. The Board of Claims Act should be
amended to allow recovery for tortious conduct other than negli-
gent acts.
Settlements and stipulations. The problem of settlement and
the accompanying technique of stipulation is a more complicated
one. It would be poor administrative procedure simply to allow
® Commonwealth et al. v. Mudd, 255 S.W. 2d 989 (Ky. 1953); cf. Stepp v.
U. S., 207 F. 2d 909 (1953), an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act in
which it was held that the shooting by a sentry of a seaman who failed to halt
was use of excessive force in maldng an arrest and hence was assault and battery
exempted from the Act.
t1Ky. REV. STAT. 44.120 (1953).
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the assistant attorneys general to settle without limitation since
it would tend to replace law with discretion in a field where there
is a peculiar need for law.
It would be especially unfortunate for the future development
of state liability law if the state were represented by a litigious
attorney who attempted to nullify the beneficent purposes of the
act. Too free settlement has its perils also; the pendulum of suit
against the sovereign swings from immunity to liability and back
to immunity, and if the sovereign withdraws consent once given
it is usually because of the feeling that unwarranted claims are
being allowed.
That some claims not strictly within the present statute may
have been allowed is no basis for condemnation of the administra-
tion of the act. Practicality demands recognition of certain factors
which are apt to be involved when claims of doubtful statutory
validity are allowed. They include the cost or "nuisance value"
of small claims, the desire of a department to maintain good pub-
lic relations, the press of business which results in delegation and
subdelegation, and differences in judgment on the weight of evi-
dence. Determining which of the above factors was the cause of a
given technically unsound result is difficult, but one or many of
them are bound to be present, even though the weight accorded
the factor by the assistant attorney general or referee is impossible
of ascertainment.
Petty claims. One explanation for the failure to use all pos-
sible defenses is the fact that such failure most often occurs in
small claims. If a claimant is determined to pursue his remedy,
continued resistance by the assistant attorney general means a
hearing which is troublesome and expensive in relation to the
amount in issue. The award made when the claimant hit a "blow-
up" is an example. Instead of pleading lack of notice, the as-
sistant attorney general admitted liability.92 The amount claimed
was only $9.80. A comparable claim is the one in which claimant
alleged his car hit a hole in a highway. Lack of notice again
could have been pleaded, but liability for about half the requested
damages was admitted.93 In a claim in which damages were sought
for the cost of repairing a tire punctured by a spike used to secure
9Bd. of C1. #176 (1949).T Bd. of C1. #396 (1951).
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a cable across the highway, the district engineer could find no
negligence-heavy commercial trucks traveling over the cable had
torn the spike loose-but recommended payment. The assistant
attorney general admitted the facts but denied negligence. The
referee, however, recommended an award since the claim was
small-$32.00.94 In a similar claim, the claimant's tire was dam-
aged by a surveyor's spike on the highway. Although the district
engineer reported that "every possible precaution had been
taken," the answer admitted liability, followed by a contradictory
stipulation that all possible precautions had been taken by the De-
partment. In accordance with the pleadings payment was recom-
mended by the referee and confirmed by the Board.95
In some claims the press of business may have joined with the
smallness of the claims as a substitute for clear proof of negligent
conduct by the state. In these claims the facts presented do not
show that the Department was necessarily negligent, but neither
does any positive fact appear that indicates the Department was
not at fault. It is not unusual in such a claim for the referee to
find, on the basis of an admission of liability by the assistant at-
torney general, that "apparently the damage suffered was by rea-
son of the negligence of the agent of the defendant,"9 or that the
Department's driver "may have been at fault."97
There have been several claims in which fault might well
have been placed upon a third party, yet the Department "as-
sumed" liability. For example, a Department truck was forced to
swerve by a truck backing into its path, and, in swerving, the
Department truck hit claimant's car. No facts appear which in-
dicate the Department driver was driving too fast; on the facts of
the record the collision was the proximate result of the third
party's act. The district engineer recommended payment, how-
ever, and liability was admitted in the answer.98 In a similar claim
an award of $120 was entered when a Department driver, swerv-
ing to miss an oncoming car on the wrong side of the highway,
hit claimant's mule.99 In these claims the attitude of the Depart-
' Bd. of Cl. #485 (1952).
"Bd. of C1. #580 (1952).
' Bd. of Cl. #178 (1949).
' Bd. of C1. #95 (1948).
'Bd. of C1. #892 (1951).
"Bd. of C1. #26 (1947). See also Bd. of C1. #25 (1947).
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ment seems to have been to assume liability so long as it did not
appear the claimant was the party at fault.
Another claim which is similar to the above in that the ac-
cident appeared unavoidable, but dissimilar to the extent that a
third party was not involved, was one in which a Department
truck skidded into the claimant's auto. Liability was admitted,
but the parties then stipulated that the Department truck was
traveling at a "safe distance" behind the claimant; that the claim-
ant's car went into a skid (reasons not given) ; and that the De-
partment's driver, in trying to avoid the claimant, skidded into
him. No negligence as such was ever admitted. On the basis of
the answer and stipulation, the referee recommended payment
for "alleged negligence" and for the first time mentioned faulty
brakes on the Department truck.100
Public relations. It is impossible from a mere examination of
the records of claims filed to date to evaluate accurately the part
public relations plays in molding the final disposition of claims.
Under the present practice, with the assistant attorney general
apparently relying strongly on the facts and recommendations
contained in the district engineer's or safety supervisor's reports,
there is at least an opportunity for public relations to bear on the
final decisions. In fairness, however, it should be noted that
actual evidence of this factor in the decided claims is rare.
In one claim the damage was sustained by the claimant while
driving through a construction area. The claimant's car passed
over a rock which caused a leak in the car's oil pan. The district
engineer had this to report:
Working zone was protected by "Men Working" signs and
Mrs. Stephens followed Windrow for approximately one-
fourth (V,4) mile; however, this rock was in path of vehicle
through action on the part of the Department of Highways
and from a public relations standpoint we recommend that
the department assume liability.... (Italics writer's)
The answer admitted liability and the Board ordered an award
on the pleadings. Whether the assistant attorney general accepted
the engineer's recommendation or admitted liability in the per-
sonal belief that the Department was guilty of negligence, the fact
" Bd. of Cl. #230 (1950). It should be noted again that in these claims
the facts do not foreclose the existence of negligence, the proof is simply weak.
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remains that public relations governed the making of a report
which generally has great force in shaping the outcome of a claim.
A safety supervisor's report in another claim in which claimant
and a Department driver simultaneously backed their vehicles into
each other, recommended:
While no culpable negligence is believed to exist on the part
of the driver of vehicle No. 1. (Highway Department) and
since it is questionable as to the responsibility in this in-
stance, it is believed that the public relations aspect of the
case justifies our recommendation that the department ac-
cept liability for the damage to vehicle No. 2.
The claim, which was a small one, was allowed.
The question of "public relations," too, is sometimes inter-
twined with the cost of defending small claims-a hearing can
often consume twice the amount claimed. Yet blanket allowance
of claims for an amount below a set figure obviously is not the
solution. Applied against the sovereign, which is being sued only
because it has consented to accept liability under narrowly limited
circumstances, public relations is out of place as a factor in judg-
ing. It may be that the statute should be amended to allow de-
partmental heads to make small payments and settlements for
"public relations" purposes.
Abdication of the judging function by the Board. The above-
mentioned factors would be of less importance if the Board were
not gradually abdicating its function of judging. At the meeting
held in January 1953, the Board decided that where an assistant
attorney general has entered into a stipulation with a claimant in
regard to the facts and damages and the referee approves, the
Board will not consider the facts nor need there be evidence in the
record which makes out a case. The net result is that the adminis-
tration of the majority of claims against the state has for all
practical purposes been shifted from the quasi-judicial referee and
administrative Board and scattered among the various assistant
attorneys general and the department heads they represent.
It may be that the results of this procedure will be much the
same as would have been reached had the Board heard each
case, but that possibility does not warrant the procedure. Although
in form the Board appears to be reviewing the action taken by the
subordinates in the claims system, in the many claims where the
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assistant attorneys general have stipulated facts giving rise to li-
ability and an amount of damages, the Board and referee are in
fact and in substance automatically placing their stamp of ap-
proval on whatever action has been taken.
The action of the Board in so largely subdelegating its func-
tions is not surprising. The Board is composed of busy men with
other interests and the assistant attorney general is capable, con-
scientious, and has a most judicial temperament. He carries out
his dual attorney-judge role in an intelligent fashion. It may not
be the system set up by the statute, but it is working well and
that is fact which cannot be overlooked in the search for an ade-
quate claims procedure. Nevertheless, it still seems fundamentally
unsound to establish a system of claims administration under
which department attorneys may settle $5,000 claims for any of
the various reasons private lawyers settle claims for $5,000, and
then enter into a "stipulation" which dispenses with proof of the
claim before referee and Board. Too much can hinge on the at-
torney's temperament, work load, and inarticulate notions of
policy to make that a suitable system.
Suggested remedies. The remedy would seem to be to amend
the act to provide for authority in the assistant attorneys general
to settle small claims not worth a hearing (say, up to $500) either
before or after a formal claim is filed. Such administrative settle-
ments should be made subject to the approval of the head of the
defendant department and the Attorney General. But there is no
reason to submit them to the referee to give them a quasi-judicial
stamp. Where larger claims are involved, the adjudicatory process
should be preserved and a record should be made for the Board. 10'
For this record admitted facts could be stipulated, but where there
is a conflict in the testimony of witnesses there should be no "stip-
Under the Tennessee Board of Claims Act, the Board is forbidden to allow
any award "based wholly upon ex parte affidavits of the claimant or his witness
but the evidence upon which such award is based must be taken before the as-
sistant attorney general . . . or some other representative of the board, and re-
duced to writing for examination by the board." TENN. CODE: ANN. see. 1034.31(Williams Supp. 1950). Thus it appears that a hearing must be held in every
case even though the object of the hearing may be only to put formal proof of
the validity of the claim into the record for the Board's consideration. In this
way the Board can render an enlightened decision and act as a check on the
power of disposition which the assistant attorney general holds over the claims.
However, the requirement would seem to be disproportionately expensive where
small claims are concerned. For a thorough discussion of the Tennessee Act, see
Note, 4 VAiN L. BREv. 875 (1951).
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ulation" of the facts to resolve a complicated question of liability.
The referee should make a report which would contain the evi-
dence necessary to establish a valid claim-even if only in the
nature of affidavits and statements of accounts by doctors and
garages, etc. On such a record the Board could exercise real judg-
ment. This would involve little additional load on the assistant
attorneys general. It is their present practice to develop complete
records, including reports of the safety engineer and highway
patrol, affidavits of witnesses on the fault issue, repair estimates,
medical bills and affidavits on the damages issues. But these
elaborate records are made against a possible hearing and for the
attorneys' own satisfaction. The only thing that goes to the referee
and Board in a nonhearing case is the stipulation.
Admittedly it would involve some additional work by the
referee and Board. The referee at the present time makes a recom-
mendation in all nonhearing cases which he prepares on the
basis of the stipulation. The proposed changes would merely give
him some additional basis for his award. The Board sits to review
the referee's recommendations. The proposed change would
merely provide it with a more complete file for use in the difficult
cases. The additional burden would not be too great, and the
change would restore to the Board the possibility of exercising
judgment in nonhearing cases. After all, the task of approving
claims and supervising the work of the total claims system was
delegated to the Board. It is for the Board finally to authorize
the award upon being satisfied it is warranted urider the statutes.
The root of the problem of delegation of the judging function
is the fact that the act saddles serious adjudicatory functions on a
part-time Board composed of officials already overburdened with
other full-time responsibilities. It was necessary and inevitable
that the Board should seek some way to avoid hearing testimony
on every claim in person. The creation of the office of referee
and the use of referee's reports was a wise solution-much wiser
than delegation to administrative subordinates 02-and may turn
out to be a real contribution to the difficult problem of handling
'Under the Michigan State Administrative Board practice the claims work
was delegated to a small claims committee composed of the attorney general, high-
way commissioner, and state treasurer who in turn subdelegated the work to an
assistant attorney general, an assistant highway commissioner, and an assistant
treasurer who heard the claims in person.
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claims against the state. It has certainly been more effective than
some statutory schemes which provided for purely judicial hear-
ings0 3 and ended in stagnation.
Perhaps Kentucky's Board-Referee system strikes a good bal-
ance between the competing needs of adjudication and adminis-
trative discretion. It is not the complete solution and need not
be regarded as the final solution. It is submitted that at the present
time the adjudicatory element needs to be stressed. The statute
should be amended to provide for purely administrative settle-
ment of small claims and the practice should be changed to insure
a more definitely adjudicatory handling of larger claims. The
scope of liability should be broadened; the decisions should be
reported. With these minor changes, Kentucky's Board of Claims
offers a workable model for the solution of the knotty problem of
sovereign immunity in the average state.
" The new Michigan Court of Claims Act provides for hearings by circuit
judges. Last year the clerk's salary was more than the amount of claims satisfied.
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for judicial hearings. One result is an un-
duly restrictive interpretation of several provisions of the act.
